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Mitigating Human Rights Risks Under State-
Financed and Privatized Infrastructure Projects
MICHAEL B. LIKOSKY*
INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure projects undertaken in developing countries and transition
societies are presently sites of intense human rights struggles. For instance, pub-
lic outcry resulting from a well-orchestrated non-governmental campaign led
the World Bank to withdraw support for a series of state-sponsored dam
projects along the Narmada River in India. The Zapatistas have responded to
President Vincente Fox's offer to build a land-based Panama Canal through the
Chiapas region by claiming that it would give indigenous peoples no more than
"the crumbs left over from capitalist neo-liberal development."' Suits have been
filed in U.S. courts against Shell and Chevron2 for their alleged collusion with
the Nigerian government in squelching peaceful protests against the laying of
oil pipelines in Nigeria. These suits are high-profile instances of what Harold
Koh refers to as "transnational public law litigation" and Anne-Marie Slaughter
and David Bosco term "plaintiff's diplomacy."3 Again and again, we see the bat-
tles over human rights being fought on the terrain of the state. The recent shift
away from state sponsorship of projects and towards market-based approaches,
however, threatens to change the nature of our narratives and the possibility of
realizing a human rights-based development model.
According to conventional accounts, from the 1950s to roughly the 1990s,
infrastructure projects in many countries were financed and carried out by
*D.Phil (Oxford), J.D. (Cardozo), B.A. (Vassar). Lecturer-in-Law and Director, International
Law Programmes, Lancaster University Law School. Versions of this paper have been presented
at the University of Oxford and Lancaster University. I would like to thank Richard Falk, Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Vaughan Lowe, Aurora Voiculescu, Bryant Garth, Sally Falk Moore, William
Twining, Sol Picciotto, and David Sugarman for helpful comments and support.
1. IPS, Development or Destruction?, LATINAMERICA PRESS (May 14, 2001), at http://www.la-
press.org/ article.asp?lancode= I&artcode=2214.
2. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., Case No. C99-2506 (N.D. Cal.); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
3. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991); Anne-
Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 102 (2000).
MICHAEL B. LIKOSKY
states.4 When the state had insufficient capital or technological capacity, either
the World Bank or private transnational corporations entered the project arena
in an auxiliary capacity. As a result, when human rights problems arose in con-
nection with infrastructure projects, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and community groups targeted the state and, on occasion, the World Bank.5
Perhaps coincidentally, as these non-state initiated campaigns succeeded in
holding states and the World Bank accountable for their roles in perpetrating
human rights abuses, we were told that, due to mismanagement by and incapac-
ity of the state and the World Bank, both parties were exiting the infrastructure
business.
6
A shift is underway, initiated in many countries during the 1980s, away
from the development approach and towards the global project finance ap-
proach to infrastructure projects. Under the global project finance approach,
neither the state nor the World Bank finance or carry out infrastructure projects.
Instead, private companies seek funding for projects through international cap-
ital markets and then build and operate projects to recoup costs and to garner a
profit.7 What this shift will mean for the protection of human rights is uncertain.
Within the development paradigm, NGOs directed their strategies at states and
the World Bank. On the level of argumentation, they successfully transformed
the development discourse, promoting the idea of a more people-centered and
environmentally friendly "sustainable development" approach. With the initia-
tion of global project finance, the constellation of actors involved in specific
projects changes and the discourse of development is supplanted by the dis-
course of the market. The shift in the roster and in the roles of participants, and
the transformation of the justificatory discourse, raises questions regarding how
NGOs will convince project planners to take human rights risks into account
when undertaking infrastructure projects.
Although many countries have only recently shifted away from the develop-
ment approach and towards the global project finance approach, several countries
have been pursuing projects under the latter approach since the late 1980s.
Projects have been initiated and some even completed in such diverse infrastruc-
4. Michael B. Likosky, Editor's Introduction: Transnational Law in the Context of Power Dispari-
ties, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES at xxiv (Michael
B. Likosky ed., 2002) Ihereinafter TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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ture sectors as airports, dams, mining, power, roads, and telecommunications. We
see a common mode of argumentation, with the market discourse driving the shift
across sectors. Quite often, a small set of investment banks, international lawyers,
and insurance firms have been involved in infrastructure projects under both ap-
proaches. At the same time, great variety exists across sectors in the companies,
NGOs, governments, and other participants in specific projects.
To analyze the implications of this shift for the realization of human rights,
this article employs the concept of a "human rights risk." A human rights risk is
simply the possibility that a human rights problem will adversely affect the in-
terests of those persons undertaking an infrastructure project. Given the fact
that a common set of actors-e.g. international bankers, transnational law
firms, transnational corporations, a segment of elites in fully industrialized and
developing countries-is involved in projects across periods, we may say that
this group constitutes "those persons undertaking an infrastructure project."
This article inquires how this group approaches human rights under the devel-
opment frame and then under the global project finance frame. Part I examines
the various strategies undertaken by NGOs and community groups to manage
human rights risks in the context of infrastructure projects-transnational pub-
lic law litigation, anti-corruption legislation, and market-based mechanisms.
Part II then compares how these strategies are employed with reference to
projects undertaken under the development and global project finance ap-
proaches, examining the Narmada dams in India, the North-South Expressway
in Malaysia, and the recently proposed Puebla-Panama Plan in Mexico. In con-
clusion, several observations are made regarding the significance of the shift to-
wards privatized infrastructure projects for the realization of human rights.
1. STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS RISKS
Infrastructure projects are presently sites of intense struggles over human
rights. Planners justify projects based on their ability to produce public goods,
but, at the same time, the construction of infrastructure projects is typically asso-
ciated with human rights abuses. A growing body of interdisciplinary literature
examines attempts to realize human rights through legal means in the course of
infrastructure projects in developing countries.
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Increasingly, international law scholars are arguing that human rights law is
sufficiently developed to measure rates of compliance.8 Responding to this call, in-
ternational lawyers and international relations scholars have joined forces to ex-
plain whether, how, and why states obey international law.9 Benedict Kingsbury
and Anne-Marie Slaughter identify sociolegal studies as a key resource in this ef-
fort.'" This call coincides with an increased attention in the last five years within
sociolegal studies to how transnational legal processes function in practice."
This article adopts a sociolegal approach, drawing selectively from interna-
tional law and international relations scholarship. Thus, it asks a specific set of
8. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTON IA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLI-
ANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Richard A. Falk, Re-Framing the
Legal Agenda of World Order in the Course of a Turbulent Century, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRO-
CESSES, supra note 4, at 355; RICHARD A. FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION (1999); Louis HENKIN,
How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1979); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of
Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345
(1998); Koh, supra note 3; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process Illuminated, in TRAN-
SNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 327 [hereinafter Transnational Legal Process Illumi-
nated]; see also generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCEssEs,supra note 4.
9. See generally PETER R. BAEHR, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY IN PRACTICE (1999); Falk,supra
note 8; HENKIN,supra note 8; Kingsbury, supra note 8; Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey Interna-
tional Law?, 106 YALE L.J 2599 (1997); THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International
Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. 1.
INT'L L. 367 (1998); HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE MILLENNIUM: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS (Burns H. Weston & Stephen P Marks eds., 1999).
10. Kingsbury, supra note 8; Slaughter et al.,supra note 9.
11. See generally EVE DARIAN-SMITH, BRIDGING DIVIDES: THE CHANNEL TUNNEL AND ENGLISH
LEGAL IDENTITY IN THE NEW EUROPE (1999); LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL (Eve Darian-Smith &
Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1996); EMERGING LEGAL CERTAINTY: EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE GLOBALIZATION OF LAW (Volkmar
Gessner & Alie Cern Budak eds., 1998); FOREIGN COURTS: CIVIL LITIGATION IN FOREIGN LEGAL
CULTURES (Volkmar Gessner ed., 1996); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON
SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995); Lawrence M. Fried-
man, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65 (1996); Kath-
ryn Hendley, The Effectiveness of Legal Institutions in the Transition Economy in Post-Soviet Russia,
in GOVERNANCE, DECENTRALIZATION AND REFORM IN CHINA, INDIA AND RUSSIA (Jean-Jacques Deth-
ier ed., 2000); Kathryn Hendley et al., Do Repeat Players Behave Differently in Russia? Contractual
and Litigation Behavior of Russian Enterprises, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 833 (1999); Likosky, supra note
4, at xvii; Sally Falk Moore, An International Legal Regime and the Context of Conditionality, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 333; Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty
Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949-1999, 7 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 95 (2001);
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questions associated with the sociolegal approach. These questions include:
Why do parties pursue law to achieve their goals? What legal strategies do they
undertake? How do these legal strategies operate in practice? Do they achieve
their intended results? What are the unintended effects of these strategies? In
answering these questions, it will test many of the hypotheses developed by in-
ternational law and international relations scholars. At the same time, the pri-
mary goal is to ascertain how human rights law functions in practice in the
context of infrastructure projects in developing countries.
While no sociolegal study has been devoted explicitly to assessing strategies
for mitigating the human rights risks associated with infrastructure projects,
several international law and social science scholars have analyzed this relation-
ship in the course of asking related questions. These studies focus on a number
of areas: (1) suits filed in the courts to hold transnational corporations account-
able for human rights abuses, (2) international non-governmental and intergov-
ernmental efforts to reduce corruption in the tendering process of projects, and
(3) the emergence of market-based strategies for realizing human rights, such as
codes of conduct and ethical investment movements.
A. MITIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS RISKS THROUGH THE COURTS
In 1997, Harold Koh noted the emergence of a growing body of"transna-
tional public law litigation" designed "to vindicate public rights and values
David Nelken, The Globalization of Crime and Criminal justice: Prospects and Problems, in LAW AND
OPINION AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (M. Freeman ed., 1997); Annelise Riles, The
Virtual Sociality of Rights: The Case of "Women's Rights are Human Rights", in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 420; Carol V. Rose, The "New" Law and Development Movement
in the Post-Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 LAW & Soc'y REV. 93 (1998); Susan S. Silbey, Let
Them Eat Cake: Globalization, Postmodern Colonialism, and the Possibilities of Justice, 31 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 207 (1997); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AMER.
J. INT'L L. 470 (1995) (book review); Gunther Teubner, "Global Bukowina": Legal Pluralism in the
World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); David M. Trubek
et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies in the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the
Creation of TransnationalArenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994); Richard A. Wilson, Human
Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND CONTEXT: ANTHRO-
POLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES I (Richard A. Wilson ed., 1997) [hereinafter ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPEC-
TIVESI; Richard A. Wilson, Representing Human Rights Violations: Social Contexts and Subjectivities,
in ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 134.
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through judicial remedies."' 2 One type of transnational public law litigation in-
volves claims pursued against transnational corporations alleging human rights
abuses arising in the context of infrastructure projects. These suits are often
brought in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act, targeting U.S. compa-
nies for alleged abuses perpetrated abroad. 3 Other cases have arisen in the courts
of developing countries. 4
In a Foreign Affairs article published in 2000, Anne-Marie Slaughter and
David Boscoe argue that the use of the Alien Tort Claims Act is a form of "Plaintiff's
Diplomacy"-"a new trend towards lawsuits that shape foreign policy."' 5 Such law-
suits fall into a number of categories. The most relevant for our purposes, however,
are the "[s]uits against corporations for violations of international law."' 6 Essentially,
these cases are brought against U.S. corporations in U.S. federal courts for their role
in human rights violations abroad. According to Slaughter and Boscoe, "[b]y target-
ing major corporations and business concerns, private plaintiffs have thus become a
12. Koh, supra note 3, at 2347; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion Missionary Controversy, 82 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 534 (1988). Transnational public law liti-
gation, according to Koh, includes five characteristics:
(1) a transnationalparty structure, in which states and nonstate entities equally partic-
ipate; (2) a transnational claim structure, in which violations of domestic and interna-
tional, private and public law are all alleged in a single action; (3) a prospective focus,
fixed as much upon obtaining judicial declaration of transnational norms as upon
resolving past disputes; (4) the litigants' strategic awareness of the transportability of
those norms to other domestic and international fora for use in judicial interpretation
or political bargaining; and (5) a subsequent process of institutional dialogue among
various domestic and international, judicial and political fora to achieve ultimate
settlement.
Koh, supra note 3, at 2371.
13. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989); Richard L. Herz, Litigating EnvironmentalAbuses Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000), available at http://www.earthrights.org/pubs/
atca.shtml; Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 3.
14. See JAMIE CASSELLS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL (1993);seealso
Desmond Fernandes & Leo Saldanha, Deep Politics, Liberalisation and Corruption: The Mangalore
Power Company Controversy, LAW, Soc. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. J. (2000), at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/
global/issue/ 2000- 1/fernandes.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003); M. Galanter, Law's Elusive Prob-
lem: Learningfrom Bhopal, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, Supra note 4, at 172.
15. Slaughter & Bosco,supra note 3, at 103;seealso HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F Diamond eds., 1996) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS].
16. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 3, at 103.
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diplomatic force in their own right, forcing governments to pay attention at the
highest levels."' 7 The subject matter of these cases varies, but abuses occurring in the
context of infrastructure projects are an important source of litigation.
Many of these cases are brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act.' Passed in
1789, the statute went relatively unused until the 1980s. 9 With regard to infra-
structure projects, cases have been brought against various oil companies. For in-
stance, a group in Burma recently initiated an action against Unocal and Total for
their alleged roles in the squelching of protests by the government." Similar cases
are being pursued against Chevron2' and Shell22 for their alleged roles in violent
government actions in Nigeria. 23
Slaughter and Boscoe argue that this trend towards holding U.S. companies
accountable for human rights abuses and environmental damage caused abroad
leads to ambiguous results. On the positive side, the suits cause companies to pay
greater attention to the impact of their actions. 24 According to Slaughter and
Boscoe, however, the suits have three principal shortcomings. First, NGOs are not
necessarily democratically accountable institutions and may allow decisions that
should be made through the democratic process instead to be made by the courts.
Second, not all countries value human rights and the environment equally, and
thus to impose U.S. environmental and human rights standards on all countries is
undemocratic. Third, threatened corporations may lobby their home state gov-
ernment to curtail the scope of allowable suits under the Alien Tort Claims Act.25
For these reasons, Slaughter and Boscoe argue that the use of the Alien Tort
Claims Act should be limited to cases involving egregious human rights abuses.26
17. Id. at 107.
18. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001).
19. See Burley, supra note 13.
20. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).
21. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., Case No. C99-2506 (N.D. Cal.).
22. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
23. For similar cases, see Iota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the Amazon
oil spills); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 2000 WL 1225789 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the Bhopal
disaster).
24. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 3, at 110-11.
25. Id. Additionally, Catherine A. MacKinnon argues that these claims also discourage close re-
lationships between the attorneys and affected communities. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Col-
lective Harms Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Cautionary Note on Class Actions, 6 ILSA J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 567, 573 (2000).
26. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 3, at 11; see also Herz, supra note 17, at 573 (giving examples
of violations that might rise to an egregious level).
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Whether these arguments are valid and their prescription desirable requires
further study. We must ask about the extent to which the U.S. courts are being
used in the infrastructure context. This requires inquiry into whether the courts
are being used solely to settle disputes or instead to play a strategic role in ongo-
ing human rights negotiations, as "bargaining chip[s] for use in other political
fora."27 Second, we might inquire into what types of NGOs are bringing suits to
test whether these organizations hinder or advance democratic interests.
The efficacy of transnational public law litigation has been tested in a recent
sociolegal study, conducted by Marc Galanter, examining the claims process aris-
ing out of the massive leak of methyl isocynate at the Union Carbide plant in Bho-
pal, India.2" He argues that tort law proved inadequate to compensate victims of
the disaster. In the Bhopal case, the Indian government brought a claim against
Union Carbide on behalf of the victims of the disaster, seeking redress in the high-
compensation U.S. federal courts. The U.S. judge ruled, however, that the Indian
courts were a more appropriate venue for the case (on the basis of forum non con-
veniens).29 As a result, the case was tried in the low-remedy Indian system, and the
government secured a judgment against the company.3" According to Galanter,
while the Indian legal judgment looked good on its face, in practice, due to inad-
equate institutions, the tort regime failed to deliver on the promises of its judg-
ment.3 Based on these findings, Galanter advocates transnational tort law
reform.32 According to Galanter, the key to understanding the Bhopal disaster
and its legal aftermath lies in approaching it from a transnational vantage." As a
possible solution, Galanter argues for the further development of a transnational
private law catering to ordinary persons.34 Whether Galanter's points about India
can be generalized to other contexts requires further study.
27. Koh, supra note 3, at 2349; see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Dollarizing State and Pro-
fessional Expertise: Transnational Processes and Questions of Legitimation in State Transformation,
1960-2000, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 197; C. Joppke, Sovereignty and
Citizenship in a World of Migration, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 259.
28. Galanter, supra note 14; see, e.g., Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 2000 WL 1225789 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act); see also CASSELLS,supra note 14, at 150-51.
29. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 E2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
30. Galantersupra note 14, at 174; Bhopal Charges Stay, Indian Court Rules, CNN.coM, Aug. 28,
2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ world/asiapcf/south/08/28/india.bhopaf.
31. Galanter, supra note 14, at 172.
32. Id. at 173.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 182.
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B. Mitigating Human Rights Risks Through Anti-Corruption Legislation
Another legal strategy designed to reduce human rights abuses in infra-
structure projects targets corruption in the tendering processes of projects. The
transnational NGO Transparency International has spearheaded this move-
ment. Notable successes have been achieved in inter-governmental fora such as
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
International Chamber of Commerce. According to Susan-Rose Ackerman, the
anti-corruption strategies have succeeded in establishing that parties to an infra-
structure project are under a normative obligation to reduce corruption in the
tendering process. This has resulted in the adoption of various legal codes, both
state and non-state.3" Rose-Ackerman argues that this corruption is not only
morally bankrupt but also economically inefficient.36 While this movement has
convincingly established a normative obligation not to engage in corruption and
produced notable legislative successes, further sociolegal work is necessary to
understand how these codes are used in practice to stem human rights abuses.
Questions include: Do anti-corruption codes function differently according to
the legal culture into which they are introduced ?37 Does the nature of corruption
vary from one society to the next?38 Do laws go unenforced?
C. Mitigating Human Rights Risks Through Inter-Governmental and
Market-Based Codes
Increasingly, non-governmental organizations are developing human
rights strategies that bypass the state and target companies directly. These strat-
egies aim to produce market-based mechanisms for reducing human rights
35. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and the Global Corporation: Ethical Obligations and Work-
able Strategies, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES,supra note 4, at 148 [hereinafter Corruption and
the Global Corporation]; SUSAN ROsE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSE-
QUENCES, AND REFORM (1999) [hereinafter CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT]; SUSAN ROSE-ACKER-
MAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (978) [hereinafter CORRUPTION].
36. Corruption and the Global Corporation, supra note 35, at 151.
37. See Donald Nelken, Changing Legal Cultures, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra
note 4, at 41.
38. See William L. Twining, Reviving General Jurisprudence, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRO-
CESSES, supra note 4, at 3. Contra Transnational Legal Process Illuminated, supra note 8.
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risks, including corporate codes of conduct and ethical pension funds.39 Human
rights groups often pursue these strategies through inter-governmental organi-
zations such as the United Nations and the OECD. For instance, model codes
for companies have been issued by the International Labor Organisation (ILO)4 °
and by the General Assembly of the United Nations.4' However, these codes
rarely have enforcement mechanisms, leading commentators to praise their
moral aspirations but to question their efficacy.
2
In 1999 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the U.N. Global
Compact, which seeks to internalize human rights goals into the transnational
economy by focusing on (1) encouraging companies to adopt human rights pro-
moting policies and not to involve themselves in human rights abuses, (2) up-
holding basic labor standards, and (3) promoting environmentally sustainable
policies. The Compact advocates two paths to achieve these goals: empowering
relevant U.N. multilateral institutions and utilizing voluntary codes of con-
duct.4 3 Like codes initiated in various public and private fora, however, the U.N.
39. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPO-
RATIONS (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999); HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 14; Hans W. Baade, The Legal
Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, in I LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CON-
DUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980) [hereinafter LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF CODES OF CONDUCT]; LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT, supra; Bob Hepple, A Race to the
Top? International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20 CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y
J. 347 (1999); Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Conduct: A
Study of the Relationship Between International Legal Cooperation and Economic Development, 10
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1275 (1995); Meaghan Shaughnessy, Human Rights and the Environ-
ment: The United Nations Global Compact and the Continuing Debate About the Effectiveness of Cor-
porate Voluntary Codes of Conduct, 10 COLO. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 159 (2000); E.G. Snyder, Governing
Globalization, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 65; Thomas A. Troyer et al., Di-
vestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications for Foundations, Other Charitable Insti-
tutions, and Pension Funds, 74 GEO. L.J. 127 (1985); Aurora Voiculescu, Privatising Human Rights:
Voluntary Codes of Conduct Between Standards, Guidelines, and the Global Compact, paper
presented at the Workshop on Law and Poverty IV: Moving Toward International Poverty Law?,
May 3-4, 2001 (on file with author).
40. Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Pol-
icy (3d ed. 2001) (1977), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/en-
glish.pdf.
41. U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS (1988) (efforts at finalizing the U.N. code were abandoned in 1992).
42. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: What
Can the Sullivan and MacBride Principles Tell Us?, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 167 (1999).
43. Voiculescu, supra note 39.
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Compact lacks compliance mechanisms. Instead it relies on "'mobilizing shame'
against member state violators.""
For the purposes of this article, these codes of conduct represent an impor-
tant type of human rights risk mitigation strategy. International NGOs have
succeeded in generating codes in various arenas. Still, while many question the
efficacy of codes, little is known about how these codes function in practice.
Drafters of the codes recognize that they are not self-executing. Thus, partici-
pants employ these codes as "instruments in a continuous process of defense and
attack"45 in ongoing negotiations over human rights. The specific role of these
codes in the ongoing negotiations requires further study. Also, many of the codes
have targeted the retail industry because of the importance of brand names. Al-
though brand name is important to infrastructure companies such as Shell or
Chevron, the bulk of the companies in the infrastructure sector do not have
brand name recognition. Thus, it will also be necessary to test whether these
strategies are being employed in a broader context and to evaluate their efficacy.
In sum, the international law and social science literature addressing human
rights in the context of infrastructure projects has produced important findings
and generated a number of hypotheses in need of testing. Various strategies-lit-
igation, anti-corruption legislation, and market-based codes-have received at-
tention. By adopting a sociolegal approach, this article will next analyze how these
strategies function in practice in the context of specific infrastructure projects.
II. MITIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS RISKS IN SPECIFIC PROJECTS
The goal of this article is to explore how attempts to realize human rights
through legal strategies operate in action. In the context of infrastructure
projects undertaken in developing countries, the article focuses on how these
strategies are initiated, why parties engage in them, whether the strategies pro-
duce their intended results and what their impact is upon human rights. It
adopts a dynamic perspective, examining the different actors who initiate these
strategies, the inter-relations among strategies, and the role that these strategies
play as an infrastructure project unfolds over time. Thus, the power of human
rights law is measured by evaluating how it functions in practice in the context
44. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEx. L. REV.
1533, 1541 (1998) (book review).
45. HAROLD DWIGHT LASSWELL & MYRES McDoUGAL, LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 176 (1953).
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of a state-financed infrastructure project-the Narmada Dam in India-a glo-
bal project finance project-the North-South Expressway in Malaysia, and also
a mixed state- and global project finance infrastructure project-the Mexican
Puebla-Panama Plan.
A number of questions are asked:
1. How do different parties identify human rights problems? How do actors
decide which problems to select for attention and which ones to ignore? What
types of strategies do they devise to deal with these problems? When are the
strategies directed at the state, foreign governments, international organiza-
tions, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, and so
forth? Are certain strategies more effective than others? If strategies do not pro-
duce their intended results, what effect do they have on the behavior of other ac-
tors? How do parties respond to strategies directed at them? Do they change
their behavior? Do they initiate counter-strategies? Do parties coordinate strat-
egies? How do various strategies interact with one another? How do actors use
laws, official reports, protests, codes of conduct, and so forth as tactics in ongoing
struggles for control over an infrastructure project?
2. Does a correlation exist between the parties involved in these strategies
and respect for human rights? Does the involvement of certain actors, e.g. inter-
state organizations, NGOs, specific host, or foreign governments, and so forth
have any bearing on the realization of human rights? If so, what accounts for
these differences? Do projects that take human rights risks into account early on
avoid problems at late stages of a project?
3. Are projects funded by the state more respectful of human rights than pri-
vately funded projects? Does the role of the state in managing human rights
problems differ under each approach? Do transnational corporations take a
more prominent role with regard to human rights under the latter approach?
Are different human rights strategies initiated under each approach? Are cer-
tain strategies more effective under one approach than the other? Are strategies
developed under the state-financed approach being adapted successfully to the
privatized projects?
4. Do strategies vary according to the country in which an infrastructure
project is undertaken, the infrastructure sector, or the stage of the project? Do
mines raise different human rights issues than roads, dams than airports, and oil
pipelines than telecommunications lines? Are human rights problems different
at the development, tendering, or construction stages of a project?
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As public and private parties invest large amounts of energy and resources
to manage human rights risks, the answers to these questions have important
policy implications. If we can determine which strategies or combination of
strategies produce the best results, energy and resources can be allocated more
effectively. Thus, exploration of these issues may produce a fuller understanding
of how human rights strategies operate in practice and, in doing so, contribute to
the realization of human rights.
As indicated at numerous points above, the infrastructure field is tremen-
dously complex, involving heterogeneous actors, and also multiple countries and
sectors of the economy. For this reason, it will not be possible to arrive at ironclad
rules regarding which human rights risk strategies are most effective in all cir-
cumstances. Rather, a methodology is put forth for approaching the study of the
relationship between infrastructure projects and human rights capable of appli-
cation to past, present, and future projects.
A. Mitigating Human Rights Risks Under the State-Financed Model: The Narmada
Dam in India
In 1991, in response to highly effective community group and non-govern-
mental organization campaigns, the World Bank established an Independent
Review to examine whether it should continue financial support of the Sardar
Sarovar Dam Projects along the Narmada River.46 This project, initiated in
1987, represented the most ambitious dam project ever undertaken. Citing the
project's failure to deal appropriately with environmental and human rights
problems central to the undertaking, the World Bank withdrew support for the
project.47 It also established the World Commission on Dams, comprising lead-
ing governmental and non-governmental actors, to assess the environmental
impact of future projects. 4
46. SARDAR SAROVAR: THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW (1992); see also Friends of the
River Narmada, The Sardar Sarovar Dam: An Introduction, at http'/www.narmada.org/sardar-
sarovar.html.
47. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Learning from Narmada, May 1, 1995, at
http://wbnOO1 8.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/3ff836dc39b23cef85256885007b956b/
12a795722ea20f6e852567f5005d8933?opendocument (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
48. For more information on the World Commission on Dams, see its website, at http'/
www.dams.org/.
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The withdrawal of World Bank support did not put an end to this paradig-
matic example of the state-financed approach. Recently, public interest groups
brought a case in the Indian federal courts to have the dam project aborted. The
court responded by ordering the government to finish the dam speedily,49 and
protests have not subsided."0
The Narmada dams have been well-reported, however, and future research
along the lines suggested would explore the effects, direct and indirect, of the In-
dependent Review for the project itself. No doubt, the Review has resulted in
closer scrutiny of dams financed by the World Bank. The Bank, however, with-
drew its funding from the Dam in response to this Review, and it is not alto-
gether clear whether this withdrawal has ultimately been favorable for human
rights groups. In fact, the World Bank's ongoing participation in the dams
would perhaps have ensured the availability of a forum for bringing human
rights claims.
B. Mitigating Human Rights Risks Under the Global Project Finance Model: The
Malaysian North-South Expressway
In the late 1980s, the Malaysian government initiated the North-South Ex-
pressway, the most ambitious privately financed project undertaken in East Asia
since decolonization. The Expressway would run the entire length of Peninsular
Malaysia from Thailand to Singapore. Project planners employed an innovative
global project finance approach, the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract,
under which a private company builds and operates a road. After costs are re-
couped and profits captured through toll charges, control over the project cedes to
the government. The construction phase was completed well ahead of schedule
and widely touted by experts and government officials as an unqualified success.
5
'
The BOT contract has since become standard practice for global project finance
endeavors.
Although the government offered a rosy picture of the road, the project had
faced a number of human rights problems during the tendering phase. At the
time, a high-profile campaign was launched in parliament against the project by
49. Peter Popham, Villagers Fight to Save Homes from Dam to Halt Dam, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 19,
2000, at 16.
50. Lyla Bavadam, Going Beyond the Narmada Valley, FRONTLINE, Nov. 11-24, 2000, at http://
www.flonnet.com/fl 1723/17230400.htm.
51. Michael B. Likosky, Infrastructure for Commerce, 22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 29 (2001).
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the opposition leader, Lim Kit Siang. 2 The contract had been awarded to a well-
connected and inexperienced entrepreneur with strong ties to the ruling party.
In fact, his company, United Engineers, was a subsidiary company of the ruling
party.5 3 Lim Kit Siang brought a lawsuit against the government alleging that
the tendering process constituted corruption by government officials.5 4 Al-
though the suit did not prevail in the courts, the government nonetheless retali-
ated by jailing Slang under the Internal Securities Act."5 A high court judge was
also removed because of a judgment related to the project.5 6
Academics, officials, and the press portrayed the human rights dimensions
of the North-South Expressway as a domestic squabble. 7 References to protests,
jailings, domestic litigation, and crony capitalism highlight the domestic charac-
ter of the project. This presentation, however, underestimates the transnational
character of the Expressway, which was itselfa paradigmatic example of the glo-
bal project finance approach. For instance, although the contract was awarded
to a domestic company, the project was carried out through a complex scheme
involving over two hundred subcontractors. Also, the feasibility studies were fi-
nanced and conducted by an international consortium of businesses, including
Mitsui (Japan), Taylor Woodrow (United Kingdom) and Dragages (France). 8
Recently, a country-wide demonstration was orchestrated against increased
tolls, highlighting the need to take a longitudinal perspective on plans.59 The
right to increase tolls was contractualized. Some opposition leaders have sug-
gested that de-privatization would be desirable, with the Employee Provident
Fund taking over the project." We must ask, however, whether this might be
just another way of paying off foreign groups.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 28.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Lim Kit Siang, Speech at DAP Public Forum on "Justice for All," at http://www.malay-
sia.net/dap/sgl507.htm.
60. Id.
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C. Mitigating Human Rights Risks Under a Mixed Project: The Puebla-Panama
Plan in Mexico
In March 2001, President Vincente Fox announced the Puebla-Panama
Plan (PPP), designed to transform the long-neglected and poverty-stricken
southern region of the country into a prosperous corridor. Through airports,
railways, and ports, the PPP would connect the southern states with Asia, Cen-
tral America, Europe, and the United States. Not insignificantly, the announce-
ment coincided in time with the march on the capital by the Zapatista National
Liberation Army. Fox presented the PPP as a well-intentioned offer of reconcil-
iation to the Zapatistas, who had taken up arms against the government in 1994
in part to protest a lack of federal infrastructure investment into Chiapas.6
Rather than viewing the PPP as a well-intentioned offer, the Zapatistas ar-
gued that it represented a counter-insurgency measure. They pointed out that
the PPP would dispossess the southern indigenous communities of their lands
without paying adequate compensation.62
According to conventional representations, the PPP's relations with human
rights are a predominately domestic affair. Thus, although only recently an-
nounced, the PPP has overwhelmingly been presented as a domestic controversy
between the Fox administration and the Zapatistas. Here the specter of global
capitalism does no more than infuse the language of the contentious political dis-
course. This framing, however, neglects a number of key issues. The planning
stages were funded by several international organizations.
The Inter-American Development Bank hosted a meeting of
multilateral and bilateral agencies to explore support for an effort
to promote integration and sustainable development in the so-
called Meso-American region. Joining with the IDB on June 29th
were delegates from the World Bank, the International Finance
Corporation, the International Monetary Fund, the Central
American Bank for Economic Integration, the Andean Develop-
61. For more information about the PPP, see generally the articles collected at the Global Ex-
change Plan Puebla Panama News Archive, at http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/mexico/
ppp/archive/html.
62. Bill Weinberg, Zapistas Present Mexico with and Issue of Peace, COMMON DREAMS NEWS-
CENTER (Mar. 14, 2001),at http://www.commondreams.org/viewsOl/0314-02.htm.
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ment Corporation, the UN Development Programme, the UN
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the US
Agency for International Development, and the Japan Bank for
International Cooperation.63
Several months prior to announcing the PPP in parliament, Fox traveled
through Asia and Europe to raise capital for the project.
Although the PPP is still in the early stages of planning, it is uncertain
whether it will be undertaken through the state-financed or global project fi-
nance approach. The answer to this question is confused by the fact that the PPP
comprises numerous infrastructure projects. Thus, although Fox has indicated
that several projects will be undertaken through the global project finance ap-
proach, it is still possible that the state-financed approach will be employed in
certain instances. While this makes it difficult to identify clear-cut and narrowly
tailored research questions, it does provide an opportunity to witness the unfold-
ing of human rights risk mitigation strategies.
It is not yet clear whether the Zapatistas have allied themselves with specific
international NGOs or foreign governments. This will most likely occur, as the
Zapatistas are internationally well-connected. The interconnection of various
legal regimes and the PPP is also already complex. Domestically, Fox has used
legislation, notably the indigenous human rights bill and the PPP, as attempts to
mitigate human rights risks engendered by the PPP. The Zapatistas have put
forth a different human rights risk assessment and continue to utilize protests to
argue that the Fox human rights mitigation strategy will not rectify the under-
lying human rights problems in Chiapas. Instead, they claim that the Fox miti-
gation strategy will aggravate human rights problems."
CONCLUSION
It is not altogether clear whether NGOs are coordinating their efforts to
deal with the global project finance approach with the same seamlessness as
their counterparts, the market-approach crowd. In part, a lack of coordination
results from the divergent human rights problems raised by various infrastruc-
63. Active Cooperation Among Multilateral Banks: A New Trend, International Financial Institu-
tions Network (IF! net) (Aug. 13, 2001), at http://www.infoexport.gc.ca/ifinet/news/archives2O0 I -
e.htm.
64. See generally Global Exchange Plan Puebla Panama News Archive, supra note 61.
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ture sectors. For instance, while campaigns protesting the adverse human rights
impact of dams tend to focus on mass displacements of peoples and persons, ac-
tivists targeting the impact of mines focus on labor abuses. A countertrend of
cross-sector and well-coordinated non-governmental group campaigns also ex-
ists, however. As Susan Rose-Ackerman has shown, organizations such as
Transparency International and networks such as the Export Credit Agency
Watch focus on cross-cutting issues like corruption in the project tendering pro-
cesses and political risk insurance offered by OECD nation-states to human
rights-disrespecting projects overseas.
At the same time, closer examination of both the development and project
finance-based approaches raises questions regarding the veracity of the conven-
tional narratives. For example, much is made of the exit of the state from the in-
frastructure business. However, we continue to see state involvement through
development corporations, public regulatory action, export credit agencies, and
so forth. Also, the specter of a small group of international banks and law firms
haunts both periods. We must at least address whether the emperor has simply
changed his tailor.
I would like to suggest that we have the same emperor wearing different
clothes, and to offer some possible explanations for what has driven the change
in attire. If, for the purposes of our discussion, we leave to one side the relatively
recently independent states of the former Soviet Union, and focus on the devel-
oping countries, we see a common set of actors involved across periods.
First, as hinted at earlier, we have a common set of international banks and
law firms involved in these projects across periods. While during the develop-
ment period these banks lent money to states, now they lend money to private
corporations. There are a small number of such banks, most residing in New
York and London. The bankers rely on an equally small set of international law
firms to legalize their infrastructure agreements across periods.
Second, we have a common community of transnational corporations in-
volved. While during the development period these corporations partnered
with state public corporations, today they typically join forces with local private
companies. It is not surprising to find the same firms involved, since, for most
infrastructure sectors, technological know-how resides in the headquarters of a
small number of firms. These firms share nationalities, with most being from
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, or Japan.
That said, the clothes look very different. What accounts then for the
change? A number of explanations exist in the literature. Generally, the argu-
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ment is made that development states were inefficient and corrupt. They ran up
huge debts undertaking projects from the 1950s to the 1980s. They could no
longer afford to finance infrastructure projects, so the entrance of the market-
based approach represented a fortuitous circumstance. I would instead argue
that it was a golden parachute. I would like to suggest that it was the success of
human rights groups that drove the shift towards neo-liberalism. The market-
based approach is, in certain respects, a counter-insurgency.
As explained in the introduction, we must ask how the group of persons un-
dertaking an infrastructure project approaches human rights under the devel-
opment frame and then under the project finance frame.65 Under the
development frame, human rights were initially managed by the state. We see
this in the development discourse, which focuses on the state as the guarantor of
human rights of its subjects. This position is traceable to decolonization, in
which the remedy for colonialism was a universally-held human right by previ-
ously colonized people. This right manifested itself in the creation of sovereign
states. Thus, the state was the chosen mode of managing human rights risks dur-
ing the development phase. From the perspective of the small transnational
group running the infrastructure show, this meant that claims of inequitable in-
frastructure policies were subsumed under nation-building discourse. If the
state was involved, it was assumed that it was good for the human rights of all.
However, much of this changed in the 1980s, as the international human
rights movement succeeded in uncoupling human rights from the state. Human
rights became something that could even be exercised against states. In the infra-
structure field, this meant that groups began to hold the state accountable for
human rights abuses perpetrated in the course of carrying out infrastructure
projects. Paradoxically, as these groups succeeded in their anti-state campaigns,
they became embedded in the state. Human rights activists and organizations in
country after country began to populate state institutions. As Jonathan A. Fox
and L. David Brown conclude from a series of case studies, funded by the Mac-
Arthur Foundation, on how transnational coalitions target inter-governmental
agencies in the infrastructure sector,66 we saw the same thing happen at the in-
ternational level. Non-governmental organizations began to participate in law-
making, monitor compliance with international human rights laws, and to
65. Seesupra Introduction.
66. See generally THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOs, AND GRASS-
ROOTS MOVEMENTS (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998).
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conduct human rights and environmental risk assessments for World Bank
projects, and so forth.
My argument is that it is just as the domestic and international public institu-
tions realize their public potential that we see the recession of the state and the
World Bank from the infrastructure business. So it is the success of human rights
activists that drove the state and the World Bank out of the game. But the question
remains: have they entirely left the game?
I would answer no. Let us assume for the moment-and I realize this is a
debatable point-that the parties to an infrastructure project seek to mitigate
human rights risks at the least cost to themselves. And, as I suggested earlier, let
us define human rights risks as the probability that human rights problems will
upset the plans of the project planners. Then we might argue that it was least
costly, in the short term, to disclaim the state and World Bank as they became
democratic. Democracy, human rights, and the environment were viewed as
costly: thus, the shift to the market.
Now, the same group of parties involved in the projects all along remains.
They just wear different clothes. So the public corporations privatize. The heads
of the new private corporations are often the same group of persons that con-
trolled the public corporations. Similarly, the U.S., U.K., European, and Japa-
nese governments stop offering direct aid to developing countries. In the past,
U.S. aid has sometimes been conditioned on an agreement by the receiving gov-
ernment to involve a U.S. corporation in the particular infrastructure project
being funded. Today, we see a similar process, albeit in different institutional
guises. Political risk insurance is provided by the U.S. Import Export Bank, for
instance, when U.S. corporations are involved overseas. The state has changed
its configuration; what persists, however, is the use of the state as an instrumen-
tality for a small group of private persons.
This continuity is acceptable. We are told, however, that other elements of
the state lack the capacity to stay in the infrastructure game under the global
project finance approach. Human rights costs are then externalized onto those
persons least able to bear the costs.
In a 1999 article in the International Herald Tribune, Richard A. Falk and
Andrew Strauss pointed to a need to establish independent and democratically
accountable extra-state institutions of global governance.67 Following Falk and
67. Richard A. Falk & Andrew Strauss, Globalization Needs a Dose of Democracy, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 5, 1999, at 8.
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Strauss, I here propose the establishment of a Human Rights Risk Assessment
Unit. The purpose of this Unit would be to coordinate the efforts of various
community groups and international non-governmental organizations devoted
to realizing human rights in the course of infrastructure projects. The Unit
would not only produce information on the relationship between infrastructure
projects and human rights generally, but would also aim to assess the effective-
ness of strategies undertaken by various groups in different contexts. In doing
so, the feasibility of transnational alliances across geographies, infrastructure
sectors and issue areas would be explored. If we are lucky, infrastructure projects
would increasingly be made to deliver on their promises to produce public
goods, which are in their essence positive human rights.

